The drastic changes in the landscape of the global economy that set in starting from January of 2025 with the coming of the new US administration create new challenges for the Global South, including the BRICS+ grouping. The re-configuration of global alliances, growing protectionism and a rise in uncertainty will all generate strong headwinds for globalization, with developing economies likely to increasingly seek solutions in greater South-South economic cooperation
The drastic changes in the landscape of the global economy that set in starting from January of 2025 with the coming of the new US administration create new challenges for the Global South, including the BRICS+ grouping. The re-configuration of global alliances, growing protectionism and a rise in uncertainty will all generate strong headwinds for globalization, with developing economies likely to increasingly seek solutions in greater South-South economic cooperation. In the coming years, with liberalization impulses fading in the advanced economies, it may be the developing world that may take on the role of the main engine of a revitalized effort at globalization. If this is to be the new paradigm in the global economy, the BRICS will need to explore new modalities in the BRICS+ outreach format, expanding its scope to encompass global organizations and institutions.
Thus far, the BRICS+ format mostly focused on the invitation of the leaders of individual countries and regional blocs from the Global South to BRICS+ summits, with no invitation being extended to global organizations such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank to participate in the BRICS+ outreach meetings. At the same time, the BRICS summit declarations have traditionally contained statements of support for such multilateral organizations. The BRICS 2024 summit declaration expresses support to the WTO (article 9) and in article 11 it proclaims: “We reaffirm our commitment to maintaining a strong and effective Global Financial Safety Net with a quota-based and adequately resourced IMF at its center”. Article 7 of the 2024 BRICS summit declaration refers to the support for the initiatives of the G20. Such references and statements have become a tradition and have been made in the past BRICS summits as well. Given the significant changes in the world economy in 2025, the BRICS outreach should not be limited exclusively to individual developing economies and could also open up to regional blocs (MERCOSUR, ASEAN) and global organizations such as the Bretton Woods institutions.
There may be various modalities associated with the participation of the global institutions in BRICS outreach activities. One possibility is for the heads of these global organizations to be invited to the BRICS+ summit that has become the focal part of BRICS annual outreach to the international community. Another possibility would be to create a separate track – let’s call it BRICS++ – that is reserved expressly for discussions with global institutions as well as with the regional blocs and development institutions from the developed world. Whatever format is preferred by BRICS in the coming years, there is substantial scope for building communication lines between BRICS and global institutions as well as forums such as the G20.
Among the themes that may be discussed with the IMF could be the cooperation between the RFAs in which BRICS economies are members and the Fund – in fact there are regular consultations between the IMF and the main RFAs on the sidelines of the IMF/World Bank Annual meetings. Other themes may include the SDR mechanism and the expansion of its role in the global economy; discussions on the reinforcement of the Global Financial Safety Net (GFSN), including the role that may be played by the development institutions of the Global South in anti-crisis measures to counter global downturns and recessions. This may be a good setting to try to revitalize the role of the BRICS CRA that may coordinate such discussions between the Fund and BRICS during BRICS outreach meetings.
There are also multiple issues that may be discussed between the New Development Bank (NDB) and the World Bank – indeed both are members of the same platform of co-financing green projects (platform created in 2023 during the Annual meetings). Discussions on the joint financing of priority projects in the developing world, roadmaps of cooperation in addressing the infrastructure and digital gaps in developing countries may all feature in the agenda of such meetings during the annual BRICS outreach activities.
Finally, the WTO could also be invited for discussions in BRICS outreach summits on the role of the Global South in the global trade agenda. This would provide the WTO with much needed support at a time of escalating protectionist pressures, while the developing world could benefit from a greater focus on devising a roadmap for liberalizing South-South trade. Thus far, South-South trade liberalization is largely absent in the policy agenda of the BRICS+ group.
Overall, the current juncture opens new possibilities for the developing countries to increase their role in rendering the world economy more open and dynamic. In the past several years, the BRICS has been in expansion mode to include new members and create a “partnership belt” of allies. Working together with global and regional institutions, the BRICS could build a strong enough momentum for the growth in South-South trade, while further shifting the focus for the bloc towards boosting pragmatic economic cooperation.
Yaroslav Lissovolik – Founder jf BRICS+ Analytics.
