Armenia’s realignment with the West has eroded its leverage in the South Caucasus. The Zangezur Corridor empowers Azerbaijan and Turkey, while the US consolidates influence, and Armenia risks antagonizing both Moscow and Tehran with little in return.
In a significant shift that directly impacts the South Caucasus, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s latest moves signal further pivot toward the West, in a way that undermines Armenia’s sovereignty and regional standing. The centerpiece of this realignment is the Zangezur Corridor, a project championed by Washington and long sought by the Azerbaijan policy-makers in Baku — and warmly welcomed by their Turkish counterparts in Ankara. As a matter of fact, this pivot is already proving disastrous for Armenia, eroding its geopolitical leverage and alienating its people.
The Zangezur Corridor, running through Armenia’s Syunik province, connects mainland Azerbaijan to its Nakhchivan exclave. For Azerbaijan and Turkey, it is nothing less than a linchpin for uniting the Turkic world and expanding their regional dominance. Analysts note that the US has increasingly taken an interest in managing this route, both to counter Iranian influence and to cement Western presence in the Caucasus. While branded as a peace initiative, the corridor primarily serves the connectivity goals of Azerbaijan and Turkey — leaving Armenia at risk of becoming a mere transit zone, stripped of agency.
The White House reception for Pashinyan last month, presented as a breakthrough in regional diplomacy (and a Donald Trump’s “peacemaking” victory), was seen by many Armenians as a political spectacle and even an insult to the country’s dignity. In fact, one can say that, in Washington, everyone achieved their goals except Armenia: Azerbaijan secured its long-sought passage, Turkey advanced its regional agenda (framed in neo-Ottomanist and pan-Turkist terms, as usual), and the US in turn consolidated its influence in a strategic corridor. As for Armenia, it gained little more than vague promises of economic benefit. Moreover, the deal arguably legitimated the Azerbaijan ethnic cleansing of Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. No wonder protests erupted in Yerevan, with critics decrying the move as capitulation disguised as statesmanship.
Pashinyan has since launched a large-scale campaign to justify what many view as treachery, portraying the corridor as a gateway to prosperity. He has spoken of railways, pipelines, and digital infrastructure that will supposedly transform Armenia into a hub of regional trade. Be as it may, the reality thus far is less optimistic: Armenia remains diplomatically isolated, its borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan closed, and its economy suffering contraction.
One may recall that Armenia’s drift toward the West began in earnest after Russia’s perceived “inaction” during the 2020 war and Azerbaijan’s 2023 takeover of Nagorno-Karabakh, which displaced over 100,000 ethnic Armenians. Since 2020, Russian peacekeepers had monitored the Azerbaijani-Armenian border, but the Lachin corridor crisis after 2022 weakened Moscow’s role and opened space for Washington to expand its influence, with Brussels also gaining ground. As Moscow has remained absorbed in its proxy attrition conflict with the United States in Ukraine — a crisis largely precipitated by the West since 2014 — Russia has seen its guarantor role in Armenia largely erode.
Disillusioned with Moscow, Pashinyan turned to Washington and Brussels, even pushing EU accession legislation earlier this year. As I argued in 2023, Western missions in Armenia expanded despite their failure to secure lasting benefits. And as I reiterated in March 2025, the Caucasus does not reward rigid alliances; Armenia’s future lies in mastering the art of balance and pursuing multi-alignment. Pashinyan’s one-sided tilt thus represents a strategic error of historic proportions.
Even Azerbaijan has avoided a full tilt to the West, instead balancing relations with Russia, Turkey, and Western powers. This multi-vector approach has boosted its clout after Nagorno-Karabakh, letting Baku advance its interests without burning bridges.
Among other things, the Zangezur deal is also a maneuver designed to squeeze Iran out of the Caucasus. Tehran has obviously openly opposed the project, seeing it as a Western-backed attempt to curtail Iranian influence. Armenia, by aligning itself too closely with Washington’s plans, therefore risks antagonizing both Tehran and Moscow, thereby multiplying its vulnerabilities. So much for the narrative of Armenia gaining new friends: in practice, it is alienating its neighbors without securing firm guarantees from its new patrons.
Further complicating this complex enough picture is Pashinyan’s outreach to China. In Tianjin, he and President Xi Jinping announced the establishment of a strategic partnership, with Beijing expressing support for Armenia’s aspiration to join the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. Armenia even proposed linking its “Crossroads of Peace” plan with China’s Belt and Road Initiative. Ambitious enough on paper, this effort risks clashing with the US-backed Zangezur Corridor. In other words, Pashinyan is attempting to straddle two rival powers while lacking the leverage to succeed. Critics warn that Armenia could end up squeezed between Washington’s and Beijing’s competing designs.
So far, the economic dividends from the Western pivot remain elusive. The EU’s pledge of 270 million euros for Armenia’s participation in a Black Sea project is dwarfed by the strategic concessions extracted in return. Meanwhile, Armenia’s trade turnover has plummeted. The government’s rhetoric about “prosperity through connectivity” looks increasingly like a mere attempt to mask strategic losses with promises of investment that may never materialize.
As a matter of fact, the Caucasus has always punished overreliance on a single camp. Again, the emerging multipolar order, as the Global South has demonstrated, is all about non-alignment and pragmatic balance. Pashinyan’s tilt to the West has thus far achieved neither prosperity nor security. Instead, it has mocked Armenia’s sovereignty and interests, leaving the country more vulnerable than before.
In the end, from an Armenian perspective, the country’s path forward should lie not in capitulation but in recalibrating its foreign policy toward multi-alignment — leveraging ties with Russia, Iran, China, and even the West, but without surrendering sovereignty. Anything less risks betraying Armenia’s resilience and heritage.
